Byzantine Agreements were first formally proposed by Lamport [8], for use in finding faulty processors in distrubuted computer networks. In this article we will use the process of finding faults to uncover traitors in secure communications networks. Maintaining reliability in trusted networks is an important application of Byzantine Agreements. Thus by introducing the fundamentals of the Byzantine Generals problem and its generalized Agreement protocol we will establish a game theoretic solution to the cryptographic problem of secure communications networks.
Introduction
How do you uncover a traitor in a network of agents when you can only use their messages as a measure of their loyalty? A question such as this has been raised many times in communications and for some time have gone unanswered. In this paper we wish to explore the notion of faulttolerant means of communication.
A reliable communications system must be able to cope with failure of one or more of its components. We must also include the users of this communications system to be classified as components of this system. A failed component may exhibit many different types of behaviour, which may include, sending conflicting, spurious or clearly false information. This sort of problem was expressed abstractly by Lamport [8] , as the Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP).
The best way to conceptualise the BGP is to use the example of the Byzantine army poised for attack [8] . The Army is comprised of divisions each commanded by a general. Having sent out observers the general must decide on a course of action. This must be a collective decision based on all the available facts and played out by each division in unison. However in some cases there may be a traitor. We should also note that in the model presented in [8] the location of the commanding general, or for that matter the traitors does not need to be taken into account.
Broadcasting guarantees the recipient of a message that everyone else has received the same messege. This guarantee may no longer exist in a setting in which communication is peer-to-peer and some of the people within this network are traitors. In this type of setting a Byzantine Agreement offers the next best thing to a broadcast.
• The millionares' problem: There is a protocol which allows players P 1 and P 2 to find out which of the integers x 1 , x 2 is bigger, without P 1 finding out any other information about x 2 and vice versa? This is only interesting if there is a commonly known upper bound on both x 1 , x 2 .
• Game playing without a Grand Designer: Barany and Füredi [1] show how n ≥ 4 players may safely play any noncooperative game in the absence of a grand designer, even if one of the players is trying to cheat. As Linial outlines in [10] , this result can be strengthened, so that this condition will hold even if as many as ⌊ (n−1) 3 ⌋ players deviate from the rules of the game.
• Secure Voting: Consider n voters, each of whom casts one yes/no vote on an issue. At the end of the voting round we may ask that the tally be made known to all players. This observation should be taken into account in making the formal definition of "no information leaks are allowed".
We will follow Linial's lead [10] , and investigate the two main models for bad players' behaviour.
Model 1: Traitors
• Store all messages seen throughout the duration of the protocol.
• Traitors colaborate to extract as much information as possible from their records of the run.
• The behaviour of players conforming to this model are said to be curious.
• We must impose a No Information Leak clause on this model, so that No information other than that collected by the traitors as a group is stored to undermine the network.
Model 2: A more demanding model assumes that nothing with regard to the behaviour of the traitors as in the Byzantine Agreement problem. Such behaviour is described as malicious. In this situation we are more concearned with the correctness of the computation is in jeopardy. If we were to compute f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and player i refuses to reveal x i which is known only to him. If we were to compute a quantity depending on x i and tell the outcome to the other players, he intentionally sends an incorrect value, hoping no one will be able to detect it, since x i is known only to him. If it were possible to relax the requirement for no information leak, then correctness can in principle be achieved through the following commitment mechanism:
• If each player places his value for x i in an envelop containing and then all envelopes are publicly opened.
• We can evaluate f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) so that if x i is not valid we can draw from the set z 1 , . . . , z n for a valid response.
Thus we can perform these tasks without using physical envelopes. Given appropriate means for concealing information, as well as an upper bound on the number of faults, it is possible to compute both correctly and without leaking any information.
To categorize a problem so that these type of protocols may be applied could be classed as follows:
• A specification of the task which is to be performed.
• An upper bound m for the number of unreliable players out of a total of n • The assumed nature of the traitors; curious or malicious
• The countermeasures available: Either secure communication lines or a bound on the disloyal players' computational power.
The main result of this section, is that if the number m of traitors is properly bounded, so that both modes of deceit (curious and malicious) with two guarantees of safety (secure lines and restricted computational power) enable for correct and leak free computation. We must now state the results applies to our problem from Linial [10] :
(1): Given f : f 1 , . . . , f n in n variables, and n players P 1 , . . . , P n which communicate via secure channels and where each P i holds input x i known only to it. There is a protocol which is leak-free against any proper minority of curious players. Such that S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |S| ≤ ⌊ (n−1) 2 ⌋, so that every step is computationaly based on the set of messages pased to any P j (j ∈ S) can also be computed given only the x j and f j (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for j ∈ S.
In trying to compute f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) there is no way to guarantee that traitors supply their correct input values. The best that can be hoped for is that they be made to commit on certain input values, chosen independent of the inputs to good players. After such a commitment stage, the computation of f proceeds correctly and without leaking information. In any case a traitors refusal to supply an input, will result in the default value.
That is, the protocol computes a value f (y 1 , . . . , y n ) so that y i = x i for all i / ∈ S and where the y j (j ∈ S) are chosen independent of the values of x i (i / ∈ S).
The same results hold if the functions f j are replaced by probability distributions and instead of computing the functions we need to sample according to these distributions. We should also restate that the bounds on this theorem are indeed tight.
(2): Assume that one-way trapdoor permutations exist, p1356 [10] . If we modify the situation in (1) as follows we can use the following: 2 ⌋ respectively. Again the bounds are tight and the results hold also for sampling distributions rather than for evaluation of functions.
Protocols for Secure Collective Communication
Given a set of n players and an additional trusted party which may be referred to as a grand designer [5] . There are various goals that can be achieved in terms of correct, reliable and leak-free communication. In fact, all they need to do is relay their input values to the party who can compute any functions of these inputs and communicate to every player any data desired. In broad terms, our mission is to provide a protocol for the n parties to achieve all the tasks in the absence of a trusted party. The two most important instances of this general plane are:
Privacy: If we consider a protocol for computing n functions f 1 , . . . , f n , of n variables by n parties where originally party i holds x i , the value of the ith variable and where by the protocol's end it knows f i (x 1 , . . . , x n )(1 ≤ i ≤ n). The protocol is t − private if every quantity which is computable from the information viewed throughout the protocol's run by any coalition of ≤ t players, is also computable from their own inputs and outputs.
Fault tolerance: It is t − resilient if for every coalition S of no more that t parties the protocol computes a value f (y 1 , . . . , y n ) so that y i = x i for all i / ∈ S and so that y j (j ∈ S) are chosen independent on the value of x i (i / ∈ S).
We shall now express the results which hold under the assumption that traitors are computationally restricted.
Theorem 2.1 (Goldreich (1987) [7] The are four protocols to describe according to the model (cryptographic or information-theoretic) and whether bad players are assumed curious or malicious. All four protocols follow one general pattern, which is explained below. We review the solution for the case in reasonable detail and then indicate how it is modified to deal with the other three solutions.
The problem becomes more structured, when rather than dealing with a general function f the discussion focuses on a circuit which computes it with-out loss of generality, since circuits can simulate Turing Machines. In Goldreich [7] , the idea that players to collectively follow the computation carried out by the circuit moving from one gate to the next, but where each of the partial values computed in the circuit whose values which are carried on the circuits wires, is encoded as a secret shared by the players. To implement this idea one needs to be able to:
• Assign input values to the variables in a shared way.
• Perform the elementary field operations on values which are kept as shared secrets. The outcome should again be kept as a shared secret.
• If, at the computation's conclusion, each player P is to possess a certain value computed throughout, then all shares of this secret are to be handed to him by all other players.
In Linial [10] , the 2nd item is investigated at greater depth, and we shall now follow his reasoning.
If we reconsider the information-theoretic, curious, part we carry out our investigation in the following manner. Secrets are shared using a digital signature, and we need to be able to add and multiply field elements which are kept as secrets shared by all players.
Schamir [17] , goes on to describe the importance of dealing with the degree being too high, which thus needs to be reduced, This is achieved by truncating the high-order terms in g. Letting h be the polynomial obtained by deleting all terms in g (g is the secret) of degree exceeding m (m is the number of players). If a (and respectively b) is the vector whose ith coordinate is g(α i ) [respectively h(α i )] the there is a matrix C depending only on the α i such that b = aC. Thus a degree reduction, may be performed in a shared way, as follows. Each P j knows g(α j ) and fo every i we need to compute h(α i ) = j c i,j g(α j ) and inform P i . Now, P j computes c i,j g(α j ) and deals it as a shared secret among all players. Everyone then sums his shares for c i,j g(α j ) over all j, thus obtaining his share of h(α i ) = c i,j g(α j ), which becomes a shared secret. We should recall from both Schamir and Linial [17, 10] , that if s v are secrets, and s µ v is the share of s v held by player P µ then his share of s v , is s µ v . So each player passes to P i the share of h(α i ), so now P i can reconstruct the actual h(α i ). Now free term of g which is the same as the free term of h, is kept as a shared secret, as needed.
This establishes the ⌊ (n−1) 2 ⌋−privacy part of the previous theorem. The condition that n > 2m is implicit, [10] . Linial [10] also states that the more curious players cannot be tolerated by any protocol follows from Chor's result that it is impossible to compute the logical "or" function for two players [3] . Having dealt with curious players, we shall simply refer the reader to Linial's treatment of malicious players [10] .
However we must state two important results from Linial which are directly related to our secure communication theme for this report. Besides the corruption of shares, there is also a possibility that bad players who are supposed to share information with others will fail to do so. This difficulty is countered by using a verifiable secret sharing scheme [6, 12, 17] .
Secondly the malicious case states that only n ≥ 3m + 1 can be dealt with in this way. This follows the Byzantine Agreement protocol from section 3. So if players are not restricted to communicate via a secure two-party line, but can also broadcast messages, fact can increase resiliency from ⌊ (n−1)
BA and Insecure Communication Channels
The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of a collection of more general problems in Fault-tolerance. In this section we apply the work of Linial, Ben-Or and Goldreich [10, 2, 7] in an attempt to further our case for applying Byzantine Agreements to secure communication and fault detection.
Traitor-tolerance under secure communication
Before we begin we need to make two assumptions about the behaviour of traitors. There are two types of bad player in this model, curious or malicious. Curious players try to extract as much information from the fringes of operation as possible from exchanges from good players and themselves. This raises the problem of information leaks, and trying to prevent curious players from taking advantage of this source information. Malicious players will do anything, as do players in Byzantine Agreement problems. There are two models for how good players hide information:
Information-theoretic: Secure communication channels exist between every two agents. No third party can gain any information by eavesdropping messages sent on any such channel. A good example of this sort of protection against a man in the middle attack such as this, is the use of quantum cryptography over fibre optic cables. The literature postulates an alternative approach [10, 12] , Bounded Computational Resources/Cryptographic set-up: It is assumed in these models that the participants have restricted computational power.
• Secure message passing: This case is only of interest over Insecure channels and/or if there bounds on computational power allow simulating a secure communication channel.
• The "and" function: Two players have a single input bit each, and they need to compute the logical "and" of these two bits. Secure channels do not help in this problem, but this task can be performed in the cryptographic set-up.
• The millionares' problem: There is a protocol which allows players P 1 and P 2 to find out which of the integers x 1 , x 2 is bigger, without P 1 finding out any other information about x 2 and vice versa? This is only interesting if there is a commonly known upper bound on both
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(2): Assume that one-way trapdoor permutations exist, p1356 [10] . If we modify the situation in ( 2 ⌋ respectively. Again the bounds are tight and the results hold also for sampling distributions rather than for evaluation of functions.
Protocols for Secure Collective Communication
Secondly the malicious case states that only n ≥ 3m + 1 can be dealt with in this way. This follows the Byzantine Agreement protocol from section 3. So if players are not restricted to communicate via a secure two-party line, but can also broadcast messages, fact can increase resiliency from ⌊ (n−1) 3 ⌋ to ⌊ (n−1) 2 ⌋, [10] .
